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COMMENTS
DILLON TO OCHOA: THE ELUSIVE
FORESEEABILITY OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
I. INTRODUCTION
A father and his 18 year old son work for a company that
removes asbestos from the ceilings of old buildings. Their company
contracts with a local school district to remove and replace 30 ceil-
ings in a grammar school. The employees work overtime because the
work must be completed during a school holiday. Exhaust fans clean
the air of asbestos dust. The fans are equipped with safety mecha-
nisms that prevent the operation of fans unless specially fitted filters
are attached to the blowers. The filters need constant replacement,
slowing down the progress of the project. In order to install the new
ceilings by the deadline, the foreman removes the safety mechanisms
subjecting his employees to a hazardous environment. The father
and his son work in the same unfiltered room for two weeks. The
son, who removes asbestos near the blower outlet, gradually loses his
health and after two weeks is too ill to work. His father rushes him
to the hospital where they are met by the boy's mother. The two
parents worry as their son becomes nauseous and his condition wor-
sens. Both parents suffer from severe mental anguish as they watch
the slow and progressive deterioration of their son. The mother be-
comes hysterical as she watches her son gasp for breath, turn blue,
and die in her arms. As a result of seeing their son die, the father
loses considerable weight. The mother cannot sleep and suffers a
nervous breakdown, evidenced by physical nerve degeneration. Both
parents must undergo psychiatric treatment.
The California Supreme Court, applying its holding in Ochoa
v. Superior Court,' might allow the father in this hypothetical a
cause of action under the theory of negligent infliction of emotional
distress, while the mother would not have such a cause of action.
c 1987 by Paul R. Bernal
1. Ochoa v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 159, 703 P.2d 1, 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1985).
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This arbitrary result stems from the father's observation of the fore-
man's conduct.2 The mother has no cause of action, even though she
and her husband witnessed the same agonizing death that gave rise
to their severe mental distress, because she did not see the hazardous
environment in which her husband and son worked. The father, on
the other hand, observed the ongoing negligent activity of his com-
pany and its foreman, and thus may state a cause of action under
Ochoa.
Dillon v. Legg is the seminal case that established guidelines
for the current theory of emotional distress recovery in California. It
involved a child who was within the "zone of danger" (her personal
safety was threatened)' when she witnessed the resulting death of
her sister. The mother of these children was a few feet outside the
zone of danger when she, too, saw the accident. The daughter could
have had a cause of action because she feared for her safety, but the
mother could not have had a cause of action because she was not in
fear of her own personal injury. The court rejected the zone of dan-
ger rule because of the arbitrary spatial distinction of the few feet
separating the mother from the surviving daughter. Instead, the
court applied "(t]he general rules of tort law, including the concept
of negligence, proximate cause, and foreseeability." Dillon was the
first American case to hold that a parent who witnesses the negligent
infliction of death or injury on his/her child may recover for the
emotional trauma in situations where the parent does not fear immi-
nent physical harm.'
In outlining what it considered "foreseeable," the Dillon court
included three factors to be used as guidelines. The second factor,
that the plaintiff contemporaneously observe the accident, has been
strictly qualified since the time of Dillon. Case law interpreting this
second Dillon criterion has required the plaintiff to contemporane-
ously observe a sudden injury.' But, seventeen years after Dillon,
the California Supreme Court in Ochoa recently expanded the
theory of emotional distress to include not only plaintiffs who ob-
serve a sudden occurrence but also those who witness an ongoing
2. Id. at 170, 703 P.2d at 8, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 668.
3. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
4. The zone of danger rule limits recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress to
plaintiffs who suffer distress when they fear for their own physical safety. Most American
jurisdictions follow this rule. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436 (1966).
5. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 746, 441 P.2d at 924, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 84.
6. Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d at 166, 703 P.2d at 5, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 665.
7. Jansen v. Children's Hosp. Medical Center, 31 Cal. App. 3d 22, 106 Cal. Rptr. 883
(1973).
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occurrence.
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Ochoa involved a mother who saw the ongoing medical neglect
of her son while he was in custody in juvenile hall. The court
allowed the plaintiff mother to recover because she witnessed an
ongoing harmful occurrence that caused her to suffer emotional dis-
tress.' The Ochoa decision broadened Dillon, setting aside the nar-
row and arbitrary test of Dillon. Although broader, the Ochoa hold-
ing has merely replaced one arbitrary criterion with another. Just as
the zone of danger rule and the sudden occurrence criterion arbitrar-
ily limited liability between similarly situated persons, so does the
broader ongoing occurrence criterion. Whether the occurrence is sud-
den or ongoing, under Ochoa a parent who arrives on the scene after
the accident will not be permitted recovery. °
Lower courts that were confused in the wake of Dillon will be
similarly perplexed as they attempt to apply the Ochoa interpreta-
tion. This lack of guidance is recognized by Justice Grodin in his
Ochoa concurrence which states: "there remain after today's opinion
numerous questions concerning the application of the Dillon guide-
lines which have proved troublesome to the lower courts and which
this court must, sooner or later, confront and resolve."11
Justice Grodin and Chief Justice Bird questioned the viability
of Ochoa and Dillon,"2 but upheld the decisions for lack of better
criteria. Both Grodin's concurrence and Bird's concurrence and dis-
sent in Ochoa emphasize that any strict criteria established by the
court will be applied in an arbitrary manner.1" The judicial system
8. 39 Cal. 3d at 170, 703 P.2d at 8, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 668.
9. Id. at 168, 703 P.2d at 7, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 667.
10. Id. at 190, 703 P.2d at 23, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 683 (Bird, C.J., dissenting) (Chief
Justice Bird points out that the majority opinion's finding of liability hinges upon the plain-
tiff's observation of the defendant's wrongdoing).
11. Id. at 179, 703 P.2d at 14, Cal. Rptr. at 674 (Grodin, J., concurring).
12. Justice Grodin states: "Perhaps such a rule would be desirable. It must be recog-
nized, however, that it is not the rule which Dillon established." Id. Chief Justice Bird states:
"We cannot now predetermine defendant's obligation in every situation by a fixed category; no
immutable rule can establish the extent of that obligation for every circumstance of the fu-
ture." Id. at 181, 703 P.2d at 16, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 676 (Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting)(quoting Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 746, 441 P.2d at 924, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 84) (emphasis added).
See Pearson, Liability to Bystanders for Negligently Inflicted Emotional Harm - A Comment
on the Nature of Arbitrary Rules, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 477 (1984); Diamond, Dillon v. Legg
Raisited: Toward a Unified Theory of Compensating Bystanders and Relatives for Intangi-
ble Injuries, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 477 (1982); Miller, The Scope of Liability for Negligent In-
fliction of Emotional Distress: Making "The Punishment Fit the Crime," 1 U. HAWAII L.
REV. 1 (1979).
13. 39 Cal. 3d at 179, 703 P.2d at 14, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 674 (Grodin, J., concurring).
The Dillon guidelines have been strictly and mechanically applied. Id. at 182, 703 P.2d at 17,
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must remove the artificial barriers to recovery and replace them with
a test of foreseeability: only serious injuries to others which were
reasonably foreseeable to the defendant at the time of the injuries
should be recoverable by plaintiff."
This comment will address the problems inherent in the second
Dillon guideline which requires the bystander plaintiff to "contem-
poraneously observe" the negligent acts of the defendant. In part II,
an overview of pertinent American law will be discussed before ex-
plaining California's approach to bystander mental distress. A
synopsis and background of the Dillon case will be presented. Part
III will analyze the case of Dillon as a foundation to Ochoa and
other cases. Dillon's arbitrariness, which began the confusion in this
area of the law, will be illustrated. The resulting arbitrariness of the
Ochoa solution is essential to this discussion because it not only fails
to clarify this confusion, but adds to it. In part IV, a return to
"reasonable foreseeability" as advocated by the Dillon court will be
proposed. This proposal is not a return to Dillon's guidelines which
have been used by courts as requirements to recovery, but rather a
return to the underlying principle of foreseeability enunciated by
Dillon. This solution will effectively provide a standard by which
the courts can allow deserving plaintiffs to recover. A single require-
ment of "serious" mental distress will be proposed to prevent a great
influx of claimants from entering the courts. In this way, the arbi-
trary results directly attributable to the second Dillon guideline, as
interpreted by the Ochoa case, will be replaced with a standard that
minimizes inconsistent and unfair judgments.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Emotional Distress in the United States
Various policies have been adopted regarding bystander recov-
ery for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 5 The majority of
American courts do not require that physical impact accompany the
mental harm in order to bring an emotional distress cause of ac-
tion." Most states, however, have adopted requirements that limit
216 Cal. Rptr. at 676 (Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting). For a general discussion of the
mechanical application of Dillon, see Diamond, supra note 12.
14. Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d at 181, 703 P.2d at 16, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 676 (Bird, C.J., concur-
ring and dissenting). See Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 728, 441 P.2d at 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 72.
15. See M. FRANKLIN & R. RABIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORT LAW AND AL-
TERNATIVES 197-221 (3d ed. 1983); P. KEETON & R. KEETON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
THE LAW OF TORTS 367-83 (2d ed. 1977).
16. C. GREGORY, H. KALVEN & R. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 957
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recovery to some degree.17
The "zone of danger" principle, which requires that the plain-
tiff bystanders fear for their own physical safety, is one such
barrier.'" Originating from English courts, the "zone of danger" rule
allows recovery for bystander emotional distress if: (1) the distress
caused some physical harm to the plaintiff; (2) the plaintiff was in a
zone of potential personal danger from the defendant; and (3) the
resulting emotional distress was caused by the plaintiff's fear for his
own safety, not for the safety of the third party.' 9 The duty owed is
to exercise due care not to subject others to a foreseeable risk of
physical injury. 0
Closely related is the proximity requirement that the plaintiff
witness the injury. New York courts require that the bystander actu-
ally witness the accident as opposed to seeing the immediate results
of the accident. Tobin v. Grossman" is the seminal case of the cur-
rent bystander recovery approach in New York. It involved a mother
who heard the screeching of brakes, noticed her child was missing
from the house, and ran outside within seconds of the impact to see
her son lying in the street. Because the mother did not see the acci-
dent, she could not recover. The court of appeals feared that a
finding for the mother would open the door to unlimited relatives
and caretakers who were not at the scene of the accident:
[F]oreseeability, once recognized, is not so easily limited. Rela-
tives, other than the mother, such as fathers or grandparents, or
even other caretakers, equally sensitive and as easily harmed,
may be just as foreseeably affected. Hence, foreseeability would,
in short order, extend logically to caretakers other than the
mother, and ultimately to affected bystanders. 2
Other states require the existence of a physical manifestation
directly caused by the emotional distress. Weight loss, sleeplessness,
(3d ed. 1977). See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS
359-66 (5th ed. 1984); C. MORRIS & C. MORRIS, MORRIS ON TORTS 190-96 (2d ed. 1980).
17. C. GREGORY, H. KALVEN & R. EPSTEIN, supra note 16, at 957. See generally W.
PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 16, at 359-66; C. MORRIS & C. MORRIS, supra note 16,
at 190-96.
18. See supra note 4.
19. Dulieu v. White & Sons, [1901] 2 K.B. 669, 671-86.
20. See Battala v. New York, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1961).
21. 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969).
22. Id. at 615, 249 N.E.2d at 422, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 558. It is worth noting that foresee-
able harm to "children of tender years" should include foreseeable harm to the child's mother
because small children are likely to have a mother nearby. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS 353 (3d ed. 1964).
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and nerve tissue degeneration are examples of physical manifesta-
tions required by some jurisdictions .2 The majority view, as used in
Delaware, requires the emotional distress to be manifested by tangi-
ble physical injuries such as miscarriage, nervous breakdown, or pa-
ralysis." Physical proof is necessary in these jurisdictions in order to
preclude fraudulent claims.
A few states analyze the emotional distress in a traditional
negligence review, rather than setting out limiting barriers. Massa-
chusetts recently allowed the children of a man hurt in an industrial
accident to recover damages, even though the children did not view
the accident which resulted in their father's injuries. The court held
that it was foreseeable to the employer that accidents on the job
would cause emotional distress to family members who do not wit-
ness the accident.' 5
Hawaii recognizes mental distress as a general tort in which
ordinary tort principles of foreseeability apply.2' However, one case
in Hawaii, Kokua Sales & Supply v. State, following a decision to
use ordinary tort principles, has added one limitation: that the plain-
tiff be located within a reasonable distance from the scene of the
accident. 17 The case involved a grandfather living in California who
had a fatal heart attack when he received a telephone call informing
him that his daughter and granddaughter died in an automobile acci-
dent in Hawaii.' 8 Recovery was denied. Hawaii chose to apply the
ordinary tort analysis of foreseeability after reviewing the California
criteria formulated in Dillon."
B. Dillon v. Legg
The California Supreme Court, in deciding Dillon seventeen
years ago, established the precedent for emotional distress recovery
outside the "zone of danger." California became the first American
jurisdiction to hold that a relative of the injured victim could recover
23. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 18.4 (1956). See also W. PRos-
SER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 328 (4th ed. 1971).
24. Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R., 210 A.2d 709 (Del. 1965). See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 463A (1966).
25. Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, 381 Mass. 507, 413 N.E.2d 690 (1980).
26. See Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970). "[T]he question of
whether the defendant is liable to the plaintiff in any particular case will be solved most justly
by the application of general tort principles." d. at 174, 472 P.2d at 520. Rodrigues is dis-
cussed more fully in part IV of this comment.
27. 56 Hawaii 204, 532 P.2d 673 (1975).
28. Id.
29. Id.
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for emotional distress even though the relative witnessing the acci-
dent did not fear for her own safety."0
Dillon involved a child who was in the "zone of danger" when
her sister was struck by a car and died. The child bystander was
allowed a cause of action. The victim's mother saw the accident but
was outside the "zone of danger" and was therefore, under current
law, unable to recover for her mental distress. The court believed the
"zone of danger" distinction, as it related to the mental anguish suf-
fered, to be an arbitrary limit to recovery.81 The court struck down
the "zone of danger" requirement and allowed the mother to bring
suit for the foreseeable mental trauma that the defendant caused to
her. After the Dillon court took that first step toward foreseeability,
other states have followed California's lead."2
The Dillon court went further, however, and developed guide-
lines to help courts in the determination of foreseeability. Three
criteria, which were not to be used as tests or requirements, have
become the source of much debate.33 The questions to be asked by
each court on a case-by-case basis were:
(1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the ac-
cident as contrasted with one who was a distance away from it.
(2) Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional im-
pact upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous ob-
servance of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the acci-
dent from others after its occurrence.
(3) Whether plaintiff and the victim were closely related,
as contrasted with an absence of any relationship or the pres-
ence of only a distant relationship.8
The court's purpose in developing these criteria was to clarify what
was "foreseeable." As this comment will illustrate, foreseeability has
been replaced with arbitrary application of rigid requirements.
30. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
31. Id. at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
32. For a discussion of other states' reactions, both accepting and rejecting the Dillon
analysis, see Note, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Reaction to Dillon v. Legg in
California and Other States, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1248 (1974).
33. See Nolan & Ursin, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Coherence Emerg-
ing From Chaos, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 583, 587 (1982), where the Dillon criteria are called an
"analytically complex regime of arbitrary rules restricting recovery for foreseeable emotional
distress." See also Miller, supra note 12.
34. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
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III. ANALYSIS
A. The Arbitrary Second Guideline
This comment focuses on the second Dillon criterion of contem-
poraneous observation, its case law development, and the Ochoa
court's interpretation.8 The second criterion was meant to be a de-
vice for measuring the degree of foreseeability, not a bar to recovery.
The courts were to weigh the three factors of foreseeability along
with any other relevant factors and determine whether the emotional
injury to the plaintiff was foreseeable to the defendant at the time of
the accident. Dillon states:
The evaluation of these factors will indicate the degree of the
defendant's foreseeability: obviously . . . the degree of foresee-
ability of the third person's injury is far greater in the case of
his contemporaneous observance of the accident than that in
which he subsequently learns of it. . . . All these elements, of
course, shade into each other; the fixing of the obligation, inti-
mately tied into the facts, depends upon each case. 6
The Dillon court made its intent clear. Nevertheless, most
courts to date have used the second criterion as a requirement to
recovery for which it was not designed.87 In some decisions, the
second criterion has been applied strictly: if the facts meet the re-
quirement, then a cause of action is allowed.88 Other decisions view
the second criterion as a guideline: if the emotional distress was fore-
seeable and the plaintiff comes closer to seeing the accident than to
learning of it from another, then a cause of action is allowed.8
B. A Comparison of Case Law History
Before exploring the various strict and loose interpretations that
have followed the Dillon decision, a discussion of the "sudden im-
pact" development will be helpful. Courts applying the Dillon
guidelines have relied on the necessity of the bystander perceiving a
35. For a general critique of all three guidelines, see Nolan & Ursin, supra note 33;
Miller, supra note 12; and Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970).
36. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
37. "What has followed in Dillon's wake is confusion rather than clarity. The Dillon
guidelines have been strictly and mechanically applied. This has led to arbitrary, inconsistent
and inequitable results antithetical to principles enunciated in Dillon." Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d at
182, 703 P.2d at 17, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 676-77 (Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting). For
examples of strict, mechanical applications of the Dillon guidelines, see infra notes 45-63 and
accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 45-63 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 45-63 and accompanying text.
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sudden accident. For this reason, a summary of this pre-Ochoa re-
quirement will aid in the analysis.
1. The Sudden Impact Rule
Prior to the Ochoa decision in 1985, the court's determination
of "contemporaneous observance" was based on evidence that the
plaintiff actually saw or perceived a sudden impact. In Jansen v.
Children's Hospital Medical Center,40 a California court of appeal
concluded that the second Dillon criterion of contemporaneous obser-
vance referred to the observance of a sudden accident. The court, in
denying recovery to a mother who witnessed the pain-ridden deterio-
ration and death of her daughter in the hospital, decided that Dillon
"contemplates a sudden and brief event causing the child's injury."'"
The Jansen decision was based on the fact that the medical staff's
failure to diagnose the child could not have been discerned by a lay
person such as the plaintiff mother.' The court was attempting to
curtail unlimited liability.
The California Supreme Court reaffirmed Jansen's "sudden oc-
currence" requirement in Justus v. Atchison.43 Justus involved a
doctor's negligence which caused a stillborn birth while the father
was in the delivery room. The court stated that a cause of action did
not exist unless there was a "relatively sudden occurrence," but re-
fused recovery because the lay person was unaware of the doctor's
negligence. 4 '
Dillon never required a sudden occurrence, but these California
cases have interpreted the second criterion to include such a require-
ment. With this interpretation in mind, a comparison of case law
history regarding the second Dillon criterion will illustrate the arbi-
trary Dillon progeny.
2. Irreconcilable Case Law
The California courts of appeal have both strictly and loosely
construed the second guideline. 45 A review of the facts of these cases
40. 31 Cal. App. 3d 22, 106 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1973).
41. Id. at 24, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 884.
42. Id.
43. 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977).
44. Id. at 584, 565 P.2d at 135, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 110.
45. Strict application can be found in the following cases: Hathaway v. Superior Court,
112 Cal. App. 3d 728, 169 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1980); Parsons v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. App. 3d
506, 146 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1978); Cortez v. Marcias, 110 Cal. App. 3d 640, 167 Cal. Rptr. 905(1980); Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977); Mobaldi
1987]
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is helpful in demonstrating the arbitrary development of the second
Dillon guideline.
In Hathaway v. Superior Court,"' a boy was electrocuted in his
back yard when he touched an evaporative cooler. His playmate
came into the house and informed the victim's mother that something
was wrong. The mother and father went outside to see their son
dying. The court found that the accident had ended before the par-
ents went outside, thus, there was no recovery for mental distress.
The parents had not "sensorily perceived the injury causing event." 47
Nazaroffv. Superior Court" took a more liberal view of a very
similar injury. A boy fell into a neighbor's swimming pool. The
mother arrived at the scene as her son was being pulled from the
water after the drowning had already occurred. The court held that
the question of whether the accident was still in progress was open
to the jury.4" She was allowed a cause of action because the court
found that Dillon "was not creating parameters but merely guide-
lines" to foreseeability.'0
Justus v. Atchison 1 and Austin v. Regents of the University of
California52 present facts relating similar situations. However, de-
spite the similar facts, the Justus court applied the second guideline
strictly and the Austin court used a more flexible review. Plaintiff
fathers in both cases were in the delivery room when their babies
died during birth due to the defendant doctors' negligence. In Justus
the father watched the medical staff struggle to keep the baby alive.
He knew there were complications because of the commotion but
was uncertain as to the severity of the situation. The doctor told the
father the baby had died. The court determined that severe emo-
tional distress did not exist until after the doctor had informed the
father that the baby was dead, which followed the actual moment of
death.58
v. Regents of the University of California, 55 Cal. App. 3d 573, 127 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1976).
Court of appeal decisions which have taken a more flexible view include: Nazaroff v.
Superior Court, 80 Cal. App. 3d 553, 145 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1978); Archibald v. Braverman,
275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1979); Austin v. Regents of the University of
California, 89 Cal. App. 3d 354, 152 Cal. Rptr. 420 (1979).
46. 112 Cal. App. 3d 728, 169 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1980).
47. Hathaway, 112 Cal. App. 3d at 736, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 440.
48. 80 Cal. App. 3d 553, 145 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1978).
49. Id. at 566-67, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 664. (It should be noted, however, that in most
instances an electrical jolt is more of a sudden occurrence than a drowning.).
50. Id. at 562, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 661.
51. 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977).
52. 89 Cal. App. 3d 354, 152 CaL Rptr. 420 (1979).
53. Justus, 19 Cal. 3d at 585, 565 P.2d at 136, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 111.
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Austin, using the contemporaneous observance guideline from
Dillon, reached a different result. The court permitted recovery be-
cause the father learned of the death by his own observation. 4 If the
court in Justus had focused on the reasonable foreseeability of the
emotional distress, a decision in accord with Austin may have
resulted.
Cortez v. Marcias"5 and Mobaldi v. Regents of the University
of California5" are cases with somewhat similar situations in which
the appellate courts came to opposite results. In Cortez, a mother
watched her child die in a hospital but thought the child had only
gone to sleep. Moments later the nurse informed the mother that her
child had died. The court denied recovery, holding that the
emotional distress had not occurred from the contemporaneous obser-
vance but from learning of the death from the nurse.5 7
The Mobaldi court was faced with a woman who watched her
son receive an injection from the defendant doctor. The injection re-
sulted in the boy becoming spastic and comatose. The court granted
recovery because the mother was present at the scene of the accident,
even though she was unaware of the causal connection between the
injection and the resulting comatose condition. 58
The guideline term, "observation," has been interpreted by
some courts, under the theory of foreseeability, to include perception.
That is, the plaintiff need not actually witness or visually see the
accident causing the mental distress. In the California court of ap-
peal case of Archibald v. Braverman,'59 a boy was severely injured
in a gunpowder explosion. His mother who merely heard the explo-
sion and arrived at the scene moments later was allowed to recover.
The court stated:
[A] plaintiff claiming damages for emotional trauma as a result
of injury to a third party must either be present at the time of
the accident or the shock sustained by the plaintiff must be
fairly contemporaneous with the accident rather than follow
when the plaintiff is informed of the whole matter at a later
date. Manifestly, the shock of seeing a child severely injured
immediately after the tortious event may be just as profound as
that experienced in witnessing the accident itself. Consequently,
54. Austin, 89 Cal. App. 3d at 358, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 422.
55. 110 Cal. App. 3d 640, 167 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1980).
56. 55 Cal. App. 3d 573, 127 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1975).
57. Cortez, 110 Cal. App. 3d at 650, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 910.
58. Mobaldi, 55 Cal. App. 3d at 583, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
59. 275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1979).
1987]
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the shock sustained by the mother was "contemporaneous" with
the explosion.... .
The court in Parsons v. Superior Court61 did not take such a liberal
view of the second guideline. There, a family was in two cars. A
mother and father were driving in a car that was following the auto-
mobile in which their daughters were passengers. The daughters
were in an auto accident and the father came upon the wreckage. He
left his car and reached the destroyed automobile "before the dust
had settled. ' '12 Because the parents missed seeing the actual automo-
bile collision, the court of appeal did not allow the parents to
recover." Had the parents been following the first car a little closer
and had they seen the injury-causing accident through their car win-
dow, the court might have granted relief for emotional distress.
These examples illustrate the arbitrary application of the sec-
ond Dillon guideline. It is difficult to reconcile such inconsistency -
however, it exists because of the malleable criterion of Dillon. Ochoa
is the latest of this long line of cases to struggle with Dillon.
C. Ochoa v. Superior Court
Ochoa involved a thirteen year old boy in Santa Clara County
juvenile hall, who became sick and needed medical attention. He was
transferred from a holding cell into the juvenile hall infirmary. His
mother visited him and was very concerned about his condition. His
pain became so great and his health so poor that his mother de-
manded that he be taken to a hospital. The juvenile hall medical
staff told her that her son, Rudy, had nothing more that a "bug."
64
Rudy suffered from bilateral pneumonia with a temperature of 105
degrees. He went into convulsions, vomited blood, experienced hallu-
cinations and held his side in an attempt to relieve the excruciating
pain. For two days his mother experienced extreme emotional and
mental distress. She begged the medical staff to admit her son to a
hospital, but she was forced to leave juvenile hall. Rudy died because
the medical staff did not take him to a hospital. His mother's mental
distress was not the result of witnessing a sudden occurrence, but
was caused by observing an ongoing occurrence. Although such a
sudden accident was required in California at that time, the court
60. Id. at 256, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 725 (citations omitted).
61. 81 Cal. App. 3d 506, 146 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1978).
62. Id. at 508-09, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 496.
63. Id. at 512, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 498.
64. Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d at 163-64, 703 P.2d at 3-4, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 663-64.
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allowed recovery, concluding:
[T]he "sudden occurrence" requirement is an unwarranted re-
striction on the Dillon guidelines. Such a restriction arbitrarily
limits liability when there is a high degree of foreseeability of
shock to the plaintiff and the shock flows from an abnormal
event, and, as such, unduly frustrates the goal of compensation
- the very purpose which the cause of action was meant to
further."
The bystander plaintiff need not know that the ongoing occur-
rence is negligent conduct. The plaintiff need only perceive the
action and be aware at that time that the defendant's conduct is
causing harm to the victim."' This essentially interprets the second
Dillon guideline to read:
(2) Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact
upon the plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous obser-
vance of a sudden or ongoing occurrence, as contrasted with
learning of the accident from others after its occurrence, and the
defendant's conduct was contemporaneously understood by the
plaintiff to be the cause of injury to the victim.
Although the majority warns that foreseeability is the appropriate
test and that the Dillon guidelines are not to be applied mechani-
cally, 7 the majority itself applies the Dillon guidelines rigidly in its
determination that Rudy Ochoa's father could not recover." This
inconsistency demonstrates the difficulty courts experience in adopt-
ing guidelines. Courts using the Dillon analysis have continued to
apply the criteria as if they were a rigid test, regardless of repeated
warnings by the California Supreme Court and appellate courts that
the Dillon guidelines are not to be used as strict barriers to
recovery. 69
65. Id. at 168, 703 P.2d at 7, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 667.
66. Id. at 170, 703 P.2d at 8, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 668.
67. "It is important to remember that the factors set forth in Dillon were mere guide-
lines to be used in assessing whether the plaintiff was a foreseeable victim of the defendant's
negligence." Id.
68. Id. at 165, 703 P.2d at 4-5, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 664-65. See also id. at 189-90, 703
P.2d at 21-23, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 681-83.
69. The Molien court, among others, expressed the same warning but following cases
did not heed their message, applying Dillon strictly. See generally Diamond, supra note 12.
The Hathaway court stated that it was following a "steady flow of Court of Appeal cases" in
its strict application of the second Dillon criterion. 112 Cal. App. 3d at 734, 169 Cal. Rptr. at
438. For commentary on this issue, see Note, Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals: Cali-
fornia's New Tort of Negligent Infliction of Serious Emotional Distress, 18 CAL. W.L. REV.
101, 118 (1982); Pearson, supra note 12, at 477-516.
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There is no indication that courts following the Ochoa view will
act differently. Chief Justice Bird foresees such an inclination. When
Bird criticized the Ochoa majority for tailoring the second guideline
of Dillon to fit the facts in Ochoa,"° she indicated that courts will
continue to misuse the Dillon criteria. Bird believes that the second
criterion will be used in the future as a requirement to recovery.
Quoting Dillon, Bird states: "We cannot now predetermine defend-
ant's obligation in every situation by a fixed category; no immutable
rule can establish the extent of that obligation for every circumstance
of the future."'7' The second guideline, whether based on the sudden
occurrence interpretation or the ongoing occurrence interpretation,
will be applied inconsistently. This inconsistency will lead to arbi-
trary results.
This arbitrariness will result from two differences: (1) the dif-
ference between courts which choose to apply Ochoa strictly from
those which choose a more flexible application, and (2) with those
courts choosing a strict review, a difference between those plaintiffs
barely passing over the line of recovery from those who barely fall
short of it.7  For example, under a literal view of Ochoa, any parent
who arrives immediately after an ongoing accident to see a severely
disfigured child will not be permitted recovery. Courts which apply
foreseeability, using Ochoa as a guideline, may find for the plaintiff
parents because the emotional distress was foreseeable."' Turning a
guideline into a line goes against the concept of foreseeability be-
cause the severe emotional distress experienced does not always
depend on whether the plaintiff observes the defendant's conduct or
is contemporaneously aware that such conduct is causing harm.74
The emotional distress suffered when a plaintiff does not meet
the requirements of recovery is often worse than that of a plaintiff
70. 39 Cal. 3d at 190, 703 P.2d at 22, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 682 (Bird, C.J., concurring and
dissenting).
71. Id. at 181, 703 P.2d at 16, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 676 (Bird, C.J., concurring and dis-
senting) (quoting Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80) (emphasis
original).
72. Arguably, any time a line is drawn, regardless of how fair it is, the line will proba-
bly seem arbitrary to those falling just short of the line. Lines, however, are drawn with the
very purpose of allowing some to recover while excluding others.
73. It is reasonably foreseeable to a tortfeasor that serious injury, viewed by parents
immediately after the incident, may cause emotional distress to those parents. In Archibald v.
Braverman, 275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969), the court noted "the shock of
seeing a child severely injured immediately after the tortious event may be just as profound as
that experienced in witnessing the accident itself." Id. at 256, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
74. Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d at 190, 703 P.2d at 22, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 682 (Bird, C.J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
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who is allowed recovery. In some situations, a fraudulent claim can
be brought simply because the plaintiff meets the requirements. In
other situations, a legitimate victim of extreme emotional distress is
excluded. Justice is not served by such arbitrary divisionsTh
D. The Dillon Criteria Must Be Replaced
Lines of demarcation are necessary in limiting recovery for in-
tangible harm, but not when they so impinge upon a foreseeability
test that foreseeability no longer is a factor. Dillon's second criterion
has been used as a "litmus test," excluding plaintiffs from recovery
before the question of foreseeability is ever addressed. Guidelines
have been used as dividing lines by courts because they fear fraudu-
lent claims will increase and become unmanageable.7 ' The
frustration and confusion of many courts is apparent in the dicta of
Ochoa."
The time has come for the Dillon criteria to be replaced with a
workable, fair test. Courts should analyze mental distress claims by
applying ordinary tort principles of foreseeability.
IV. PROPOSAL
The standards for determining emotional distress recovery as set
forth in Dillon and Ochoa are in need of revision. Ochoa not only
fails to establish a solid second guideline of "contemporaneous obser-
vance" but it also illustrates the failure of the California courts to
create a workable analysis for the Dillon guidelines. An alternative
that is workable, fair and economical is that of "reasonable foresee-
ability." This adoption of foreseeability does not require a return to
the criteria established by the Dillon court, but rather a return to the
underlying principles of foreseeability enunciated by the Dillon
court. As a safeguard against limitless liability to defendants, the
reasonably foreseeable emotional distress must also be "serious" in
nature. Before discussing seriousness, "reasonable foreseeability,"
viewed in the spirit of the Dillon decision, should be explained.
75. See Diamond, supra note 12, at 478. For a supporting analysis of a British case, see
McLoughlin v. O'Brian, [1982] 2 All E.R. 298, 319.
76. See Manie v. Matson Oldsmobile-Cadillac Co., 378 Mich. 650, 655, 148 N.W.2d
779, 781-82 (1967).
77. See Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d at 167-70, 178, 182-87, 703 P.2d at 6-8, 14, 16-21, 216 Cal.
Rptr. at 666-69, 674, 676-81.
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A. Foreseeability
Foreseeability is at the root of bystander emotional distress
issues. Foreseeability is what the Dillon court tried to impress upon
lower courts as the only crucial test to emotional distress recovery.
Foreseeability is the analysis for which the Ochoa court was striving.
Foreseeability is also the elusive doctrine that the California courts
overlook in applying arbitrary rules.
Justice Broussard in the Ochoa majority opinion stated, "The
touchstone of our analysis in Dillon was foreseeability." 8 He quotes
Dillon:
Since the chief element in determining whether defendant owes
a duty or an obligation to plaintiff is the foreseeability of the
risk, that factor will be of prime concern in every case. Because
it is inherently intertwined with foreseeability such duty or obli-
gation must necessarily be adjudicated only upon a case-by-case
basis."
Courts have missed this mark by applying strictly the guidelines set
out in Dillon.80
As stated above, the Hawaii Supreme Court has adopted fore-
seeability in a regular tort analysis of emotional distress to avoid the
arbitrary and confusing results of this strict application.8 Following
Rodrigues v. State,8" the court in Leong v. Takasaki8 held that
"when it is reasonably foreseeable that a reasonable plaintiff-witness
to an accident would not be able to cope with the mental stress en-
gendered," liability shall be imposed.8' This echoes the underlying
principle that the Dillon court espoused. The Hawaii Supreme
Court has successfully aligned itself with the Dillon "foreseeability"
approach.85 To ensure that liability remains limited while returning
78. Id. at 166, 703 P.2d at 5, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 665.
79. Id. (quoting Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80).
80. See supra notes 45-63 and accompanying text. For current discussions of this area,
see Burley, Dillon Revisited: Toward a Better Paradigm, 43 OHIo ST. L.J. 931, 931-49
(1982); Jirovec, Cooper v. Superior Court: The Judiciary's Distress Over Emotional Distress,
12 WASH. ST. U.L. REV. 917, 917-28 (1985).
81. Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974); see supra notes 26-29.
82. 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970).
83. 55 Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974).
84. Id. at 410, 520 P.2d at 765.
85. Id. at 410-11, 520 P.2d at 765-66. Those plaintiffs who have suffered extreme emo-
tional injury and would not have recovered under a strict Dillon analysis because of failure to
meet a requirement, have generally been granted relief. The Hawaii Supreme Court has, in
one case, not allowed recovery to a plaintiff who did suffer from extreme mental distress (he
died of a heart attack) as an indirect result of the defendant's negligence. See Kokua Sales &
Supply v. State, 56 Hawaii 204, 532 P.2d 673 (1975). See supra text accompanying notes 27-
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to Dillon's foreseeability, California could adopt one requirement -
that of serious emotional distress.
B. Seriousness
It is well recognized that ordinary tort foreseeability, if applied
to emotional distress claims, may open the door to unlimited liability.
A simple accident can create a chain reaction, bringing on hundreds
of plaintiffs, all injured in differing degrees.86 As a matter of econ-
omy, the line must be drawn somewhere.87 By drawing the line at
''serious" emotional distress the courts can decide cases consistently,
thus preventing arbitrary results.
Everybody suffering from recognizable serious distress, if de-
fined by the California Supreme Court, would recover. Everybody
not suffering from serious mental distress would be barred from re-
covery. The seriousness requirement might be viewed by some to be
just another test replacing the former Dillon requirements, both be-
ing arbitrary. However, injury from serious mental distress is what
the courts are trying to remedy, therefore, serious mental distress
itself should be the focus of the courts. With seriousness as a re-
quirement, victims will be allowed recovery for their actual injury.
Plaintiffs will not be granted a windfall merely because they were
"at the right place at the right time." Seriousness, of course, must be
defined.
Mental anguish is a normal and inevitable part of life. In the
New York case of Tobin v. Grossman,88 a mother saw her son being
struck by an automobile. The boy was badly hurt and the mother
suffered from emotional distress. The court pointed out:
Every injury has ramifying consequences, like the ripplings of
the waters, without end. The problem for the law is to limit the
legal consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree. The risks
of indirect harm from the loss or injury of loved ones is perva-
sive and inevitably realized at one time or another. Only a very
small part of that risk is brought about by the culpable act of
others. This is the risk of living and bearing children."
28.
86. See W. PROSSER, Palsgraf Revisited, in SELECTED Topics ON THE LAW OF TORTS
218-19 n.10 (1953); Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928); In
re Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 944 (1964).
87. See W. PROSSER, supra note 86, at 216-17, 218 n.10.
88. 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969).
89. Id. at 630, 249 N.E.2d at 424, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 561-62 (concluding paragraph of
majority opinion). It should be noted that although the plaintiff had physical manifestations
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A legal wrong should only exist when there is an unusual or severe
mental harm, otherwise every disturbing episode in life would be
cause for a lawsuit. But determining the severity of the emotional
damage is difficult to pinpoint in many situations. When physical
manifestations of the mental trauma are lacking, it is difficult to
measure severity. Psychological evidence can be subjective90 and ex-
pert testimony can be found to support either side of a claim. A court
that uses "seriousness" as a test must have a standard.
Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, a recent California
Supreme Court case, dealt with the issue of seriousness. It involved a
woman who was misdiagnosed to have syphilis. She was told to in-
form her husband of her illness so that he could be examined and
medically treated. The wife became suspicious that he had engaged
in extramarital affairs. This tension led to the dissolution of their
marriage. The husband was diagnosed and the hospital found he did
not have syphilis. It was later learned that the initial diagnosis of the
wife having syphilis was incorrect. The husband sued the hospital
for extreme mental distress.' The court allowed recovery despite the
fact that the husband suffered from no immediate physical injury
(e.g. broken bones) as a result of his diagnosis." The court asserted
that serious mental distress manifests itself in physical symptoms'
4
(e.g. nerve fiber degeneration, weight loss)." It was emphasized that
"mental injur[ies] are marked by definite physical symptoms, which
are capable of clear medical proof. . . . [T]he problem is one of
proof, and it will not be necessary to deny a remedy in all cases
resulting from her mental distress, the New York court of appeals still refused to grant recov-
ery. One commentator addressing the issue of serious emotional distress suggests "limiting
recovery to cases of emotional distress that most people do not face with sufficient frequency or
sufficient certainty to anticipate, to prepare for, and thus to absorb without suffering severe or
permanent emotional damage." Note, Limiting Liability for the Negligent Infliction of Emo-
tional Distress: The "Bystander Recovery" Cases, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 847, 868 (1981). A
discussion of this "threshold of 'seriousness' " requirement can be found in Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d
at 179-80, 703 P.2d at 15, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 675 (Grodin, J., concurring).
90. For an article addressing the problems of expert psychological testimony, see Dia-
mond and Louisell, The Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness: Some Ruminations and Specula-
tions, 63 MICH. L. REV. 1335 (1965).
91. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980). This is a direct victim
case and not a bystander recovery case. Nonetheless, it contains dicta regarding the question of
seriousness and foreseeability.
92. The Dillon guidelines were never used in this case because the husband was found
to be a direct victim, not a bystander. The general principles of foreseeability were applied to
the facts. Id. at 923, 616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834.
93. Id. at 916, 616 P.2d at 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
94. Id. at 926, 616 P.2d at 818, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 836.
95. See infra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
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because some claims may be false." 9
The Molien court's requirement of serious mental distress is
similar to that of the Hawaii case of Rodrigues."' The Rodrigues
court determined that serious mental distress occurs "where a rea-
sonable man, normally constituted, would be unable to adequately
cope with the mental stress engendered by the circumstances of the
case."
98
There is, of course, a problem in identifying legitimate mental
distress. Advances in medicine and science, however, have enabled
courts to recognize serious mental distress with some accuracy." The
Molien court believed that medical science would probably guarantee
detection of legitimate or false claims.1 00 Detection would be possible
because serious mental distress results in physical symptoms of in-
jury.101 Thus, plaintiffs suffering from nerve fiber degeneration,
sleeplessness, great weight loss, intense nervousness, personality
changes, or other medically recognized symptoms of mental distress,
will be allowed a cause of action.
The Restatement Second of Torts provides guidance in deter-
mining serious mental distress from that which is not serious.
Temporary fright, nervous shock, nausea, grief, rage and humiliation
are not considered serious.' 02
Medical records, either from a hospital or the office of a psychi-
atrist whose help the plaintiff has sought, can establish whether the
mental distress was serious under the Restatement Second definition.
Juries would determine the validity of such reports because to have
the court decide would be to usurp the powers of the juries. The
96. Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 926, 616 P.2d at 818, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 836 (quoting W.
PROSSER, TORTS 328 (4th ed. 1971)).
97. 27 Cal. 3d at 928, 616 P.2d at 819-20, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 837-38.
98. 52 Hawaii at 173, 472 P.2d at 520.
99. See Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 159 n.10, 404 A.2d 672, 679 n.10 (1979); Note, Sinn
v. Burd, 63 GEo. L.J. 1179, 1184-85 (1975).
100. See generally Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 924-25, 616 P.2d at 817-18, 167 Cal. Rptr. at
835-36.
101. Comment, The Common Law Treatment in Wisconsin of the Right to Recover for
Emotional Harm, 1977 Wis. L. REv. 1089, 1103 n.22.
102.
The fact that these are accompanied by transitory, non-recurring physical phe-
nomena, harmless in themselves, such as dizziness, vomiting and the like, does
not make the actor liable where such phenomena are in themselves inconsequen-
tial and do not amount to any substantial bodily harm. On the other hand, long
continued nausea or headaches may amount to physical illness, which is bodily
harm; and even long continued mental disturbance . . . may be classified by the
courts as illness, notwithstanding [its] mental character.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A, comment c (1966).
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Molien court dissent questioned whether the jury would be capable
of evaluating medical testimony, but there is ample support for the
belief that jurors are capable of recognizing fraudulent claims."'
This standard of seriousness would prevent frivolous claims
from flooding the courts. Mental distress that does not reach the re-
quired level of seriousness would be considered part of the ordinary
emotional distress that accompanies a normal life, and thus no recov-
ery would be granted.
It should be stressed that seriousness is a factor that is vital to
the underlying principles of Dillon's foreseeability guidelines. Seri-
ousness is a measure of degree, and that is what the Dillon court
intended by labeling its criteria as measuring "guidelines" instead of
using the term "rules." The Hawaii Supreme Court, in Leong v.
Takasaki, emphasized that the Dillon criteria "should not be
employed by a trial court to bar recovery but should at most be in-
dicative of the degree of mental distress suffered.
10 4
The arbitrariness inherent in the Ochoa guideline would be re-
placed by a test that goes directly to the heart of the claim - the
reasonable foreseeability of serious mental distress. With this as a
basis and a requirement of "seriousness" to limit unwarranted
claims, California could have a workable and practical standard for
granting recovery to bystanders who are emotionally distressed as a
result of a defendant's misconduct.
C. The Proposal Applied
Although the standard of reasonably foreseeable and serious
emotional distress is workable, it may be subject to arbitrariness if
different courts apply the guideline with substantial variance. The
California Supreme Court or the Legislature will have to create ba-
sic guidelines because "foreseeability" is an elusive concept. An
adherence to general concepts of tort negligence would result in judg-
ments that would be fair. For instance, generally, the closer the rela-
tionship between the emotionally distressed plaintiff and the physi-
cally injured victim, the greater the chance of finding that the
defendant owed a duty of care.10 5
103. See Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 737, 441 P.2d at 918, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 78; Tobin, 24
N.Y.2d at 615-16, 249 N.E.2d at 422, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 558-59; Sinn, 486 Pa. at 160, 404
A.2d at 679.
104. 55 Hawaii at 410, 520 P.2d at 766 (emphasis added). For a development of com-
mon law relating to this case, see Annot., 94 A.L.R.3d 471 (1979).
105. California currently requires that the plaintiff bystander be a family member of the
victim. In Drew v. Drake, 110 Cal. App. 3d 555, 168 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1980), the court deter-
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Other examples of tort law will help to clarify the result of
applying the proposed standard. The factors of each case should be
weighed by the court. Factors such as seeing an accident or the im-
mediate aftermath of the accident should not be requirements for
recovery. However, these factors do indicate the extent of foreseeable
harm. For example, a defendant who injures a child by negligently
operating his/her automobile can reasonably foresee that the child's
mother is at least within seeing or hearing distance. 0 6 It also seems
foreseeable that close family members of an injured person may be
called to the scene and will witness the immediate results of a horri-
ble accident, thus causing serious emotional distress.
Determining how much time must pass before liability is lim-
ited is a difficult task. The plaintiffs should have to view the result of
the accident within moments or perhaps hours of the injury. Mo-
ments seems more reasonable because the serious impact of the shock
is the cause of the emotional distress. But, it must be stressed that
each case should be decided on its own merits, and the circumstances
of the case should not be subject to arbitrary time limits. For exam-
ple, bystander plaintiffs returning to their home after a vacation can
witness a horrible sight if they arrive to see their dead son's body a
day after he has been murdered.
It seems acceptable to exclude most telephone conversations, es-
pecially long distance conversations (because the receiver of the call
cannot readily view the result of the accident) from the area of rea-
sonableness.'01 The impact of seeing the victim severely injured is
generally more emotionally distressing than hearing that the victim is
severely injured. Again, it will depend on the circumstances. If the
mined that the Dillon requirement of "close relationship," as found in the third criterion,
means a relationship analogous to parent and child or husband and wife. Id. at 557, 168 Cal.
Rptr. at 65-66. In this case, unmarried "live in spouses" lived as husband and wife for three
years. Even though one spouse visually witnessed an accident in which the other was killed,
the court denied recovery. Id. For a discussion of the related area of spousal consortium, see
Hendrix v. General Motors, 146 Cal. App. 3d 296, 193 Cal. Rptr. 922 (1983), in which the
court stated "[no state court has ever allowed an unmarried plaintiff to state a claim for loss of
consortium." d. at __ , 193 Cal. Rptr. at 927. The Supreme Court of New Jersey, in
Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980), decided that "[tlhe existence of a marital or
intimate familial relationship is . . . an essential element of a cause of action for negligent
infliction of emotional distress." Id. at 98, 417 A.2d at 527.
106. See Tobin, 24 N.Y.2d at 615, 249 N.E.2d at 422, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 558. See supra
note 22 and accompanying text; W. PROSSER, supra note 22.
107. Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 63 Hawaii 557, 565, 632 P.2d 1066,
1071 (1981); Kokua Sales & Supply, 56 Hawaii 204, 532 P.2d 673 (1975); Leong, 55 Hawaii
at 410-11, 520 P.2d at 765-66; Rodrigues, 82 Hawaii at 174, 472 P.2d at 520; see supra text
accompanying notes 26-28. For the result the Hawaii Supreme Court rendered when faced
with the same issue see infra notes 110, 116, and text accompanying notes 114-16.
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California Supreme Court decides that telephone conversations
should be included in the realm of emotional distress recovery, the
court can tailor its "weighing instructions" regarding seriousness of
emotional impact to conform to its standard of seriousness. In this
way, the court can define the penumbra of "seriousness" and
foreseeability. Lower courts can follow such a standard, not as re-
quirements to recovery, but as guidelines.1 °
Some bystanders are more likely to become emotionally dis-
tressed than others. This is the reason for the "serious" emotional
distress requirement. But, even "thin skulled" plaintiffs0 9 can incur
serious mental distress upon seeing an accident that would not nor-
mally create serious mental distress in an average bystander.
Although general tort theory allows such a plaintiff to recover, the
standard of reasonable foreseeability of emotional distress adopted in
Hawaii does not grant such relief.110
There will be problems with every system established to grant
relief. The courts will have to face these problems and resolve them
in a manner that is the least arbitrary. Having a flexible standard
may at first appear arbitrary, but being able to judge every situation
on a case by case basis is more fair to both plaintiffs and defendants
of emotional distress cases. This comment would not be complete
without investigating the theories that support the status quo of Cal-
ifornia emotional distress recovery.
D. The Opposition
The argument for strict application of Dillon criteria is enticing
108. Even if the California Supreme Court insists upon rigid parameters of seriousness,
listing what cannot be considered "serious" mental distress, it would present a more workable
system than the current arbitrary approach. Under rigid requirements of "seriousness," every
plaintiff would be treated fairly. Claimants who suffer from emotional distress arising from
similar situations would not be treated arbitrarily. For example, if two persons witness the
aftermath of an accident and both suffer the same amount of emotional distress, but only one
witness happens to observe the negligence of the tortfeasor, the rigid "seriousness" requirement
would either enable both witnesses to recover, or neither witness to recover. The court would
merely focus on whether the resulting emotional distress was 1) foreseeable and 2) serious.
109. See W. PROSSER, supra note 23, § 43, at 260-63; Comment, Negligence and the
Infliction of Emotional Harm: A Reappraisal of the Nervous Shock Cases, 35 U. CHI. L.
REv. 512, 519 n.31 (1968).
110. The Hawaii Supreme Court in Leong held that plaintiffs would have to prove that
it was "reasonably foreseeable that a reasonable plaintiff-witness to an accident would not be
able to cope" in order to recover on a claim of emotional distress. 55 Hawaii at 410-11, 520
P.2d at 765. One commentator states, "If 'serious' is deemed too vague, it would not seem
objectionable to require foreseeability of a degree of distress beyond that with which the aver-
age person should be expected to cope." Miller, supra note 12, at 36-37 n.196.
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but unfair in its arbitrariness. It can be argued that limiting liability
in this area necessarily means having arbitrary guidelines. Those
who support a strict Dillon enforcement can advance two major
benefits of having strict limits to recovery. First, liability will be ef-
fectively limited. Second, such rigid rules help jurors and guide lower
courts.111 But the exclusion of wronged plaintiffs from the courtroom
is too high a price to pay for attempting to guide jurors and courts.
The Dillon court itself quoted from two cases when it stated:
[We] should be sorry to adopt a rule which would bar all such
claims on grounds of policy alone, and in order to prevent the
possible success of unrighteous or groundless actions. Such a
course involves the denial of redress in meritorious cases, and it
necessarily implies a certain degree of distrust, which [we] do
not share, in the capacity of legal tribunals to get at the truth in
this class of claim.1
1 2
Some states have found ordinary tort analysis to be a viable al-
ternative to the Dillon criteria. Hawaii, upon rejecting the three
guidelines of Dillon, did not experience the influx of fraudulent
claims feared by the California courts.1 8 Rodrigues v. State"4 was
the seminal Hawaii case which determined that negligent infliction
of emotional distress issues should be decided by the application of
general tort principles. 1 Eleven years later, the Hawaii Supreme
Court declared, "[s]ince our holding in Rodrigues, there has been no
'plethora of similar cases'; the fears of unlimited liability have not
proved true."1 1  This is important because limitless liability is one of
the strongest arguments for those who advocate the strict application
of the Dillon guidelines.11 7 Hawaii courts have indicated that this
result does not necessarily follow from a return to reasonable
foreseeability.
111. For an interesting discussion of barriers used to guide lower courts, see Note, Tort
Law - Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress in Accident Cases - The Expanding
Definition of Liability, I W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 795, 803 (1979).
112. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 744, 441 P.2d at 923, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 83 (quoting Ham-
brook v. Stokes Bros., [1925] 1 K.B. 141) (quoting the origin of the quotation, Dulieu v. White
& Sons, [1901] 2 K.B. 669, 681).
113. See supra note 111.
114. 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970).
115. Id.
116. Campbell, 63 Hawaii at 565, 632 P.2d at 1071. This case allowed recovery for
mental distress suffered when the plaintiff's dog died. This is probably a broader interpreta-
tion of foreseeability than most jurisdictions would accept. Also, Hawaii has since imposed one
requirement, that of reasonable distance. Kokua Sales & Supply, 56 Hawaii 204, 532 P.2d
673 (1975); see supra text accompanying notes 27-29.
117. See supra notes 45-63 and accompanying text.
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But even if the floodgates of litigation were open to fraudulent
claims, it is the duty of the court to decide which are fraudulent and
which are legitimate. The purpose of allowing negligent infliction of
emotional distress as a cause of action in California is to remedy
wrongs negligently inflicted on bystanders of the accident. The di-
lemma the courts face is the problem of allowing deserving claimants
relief while reducing or eliminating frivolous claims. To protect the
court, insurance companies, and the public from unlimited costs,
there are safeguards other than the arbitrary second criterion that
will enable the court to separate the fraudulent from the sincere.' 8
The proposed reasonable foreseeability of serious mental distress
does provide a more equitable approach to negligent infliction of
emotional distress, allowing sincere plaintiffs recovery.
V. CONCLUSION
Returning to the original asbestos hypothetical, the mother of
the 18 year old boy who died would be allowed recovery if (1) the
mental distress she suffered was the result of the defendant's negli-
gence, (2) the emotional distress was foreseeable to the defendant,
and (3) the mental distress was serious in nature. The psychiatric
care that the parents needed, after the mother's nervous breakdown
and sleeplessness and the father's severe weight loss, indicates that
their case should go before a jury. The jury would have to be
instructed as to what degree of seriousness the court deems appropri-
ate. This level of seriousness would have to be established by the
California Supreme Court or the California Legislature so that arbi-
trariness would not result between different courts. Again, this
delineation of seriousness would be used as a guide, not a test, and
the jury would have to decide upon the facts of each case.
Under this proposed standard of ordinary tort foreseeability, by-
stander mental distress claims will be simplified and decided without
arbitrary results. Those who prove they 'have suffered from serious,
foreseeable mental distress will be allowed a cause of action. The
increase in fraudulent claims, if any, should be accepted because the
courts have a duty to determine legitimacy of claims on a case by
case basis.
118. For a theory of compensating emotional distress victims only for their economic
loss, see Diamond, supra note 12. General principles of tort law as they apply to emotional
recovery are discussed in Peck, The Role of the Courts and Legislatures in the Reform of Tort
Law, 48 MINN. L. REV. 265, 308 (1963). For an overview of many alternative approaches, see
Miller, supra note 12.
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In demonstrating the difficulty of applying the Dillon guide-
lines, the Ochoa court has done much to develop the area of by-
stander emotional distress. However, the court failed to produce a
guideline that is not subject to arbitrary results. By replacing "rea-
sonable foreseeability" to mental distress, the proposed standard will
allow recovery to those seriously harmed while excluding those who
merely experience the suffering that is part of being alive.
Paul R. Bernal

